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This is an appeal from a final judgment and the lower 
court's subsequent denial of Chanhmany's Motion for an Additur or 
in the alternative a new trial. Chanhmany also appeals the lower 
court's order striking her general damages award. Although the 
uncontested evidence showed that Chanhmany sustained more than 
$3,000 in medical expenses resulting from an automobile accident, 
the jury awarded only $2,100 as reasonable compensation for her 
medical expenses. 
In Chanhmany1s opening brief, she argued that the lower 
court's denial of her motion for an additur or a new trial lacked 
a reasonable basis because: (1) Based on the uncontested and 
overwhelming evidence, reasonable minds could only conclude that 
Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses. (2) To 
award less than $3,000 in medical expenses, the jury disregarded 
uncontested evidence. (3) The threshold statute does not justify 
striking the general damages award because whether Chanhmany met 
the medical expense threshold was not a trial issue. The threshold 
issue was not presented to the jury. In addition, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 31A-22-307 provides the procedure for resolving a threshold issue 
dispute. Neither party followed the procedure because threshold 
medical damages simply was not a trial issue. 
Chanhmany also said that her general damage award should 
not have been stricken because based on the evidence, reasonable 
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minds must conclude that Chanhmany is permanently disabled. Both 
sides medical experts testified that Chanhmany was permanently 
impaired. Chanhmany's medical expert concluded that she was 
disabled. Bone's medical expert did not challenge that conclusion. 
Chanhmany and her co-workers explained how the impairment 
restricted her work and lifestyle activities. At the conclusion of 
the evidence, the trial court judge was convinced Chanhmany was 
disabled and entitled to compensation. Thus, the jury was not 
instructed on the threshold issue of disability, nor were they 
asked to determine whether Chanhmany was permanently disabled. 
In addition, Chanhmany showed that the verdict is a 
product of prejudice. The jury's disregard of the uncontested 
evidence coupled with the unreasonably low verdict and admissions 
by jurors on voir dire, all establish that the verdict was a 
product of prejudice against chiropractic treatment. 
Finally, Chanhmany said the lower court denied her a 
constitutional right to a jury trial on the disability issue. 
Chanhmany noted the determination of disability is a question of 
fact and explained that the Court by not presenting the issue to 
the jury and then necessarily concluding that Chanhmany was not 
disabled when the court struck the general damages award, denied 
her the right of a jury trial on this important factual issue. 
In response, Defendant Bone says that Chanhmany failed to 
plead and prove that she met the medical expense threshold set 
forth in Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 (e) and that the jury could and 
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did reasonably find that Chanhmany's necessary medical expenses 
were less than $3,000 (Appellee's Brief pp. 11 - 13). Bone 
mistakenly relies on case law from Colorado, Pennsylvania and New 
York, states which have no fault statutes different than Utah's, 
for the proposition that whether threshold is met is a jury issue 
upon which the plaintiff has the burden of proof. Bone ignores 
Utah case law which inescapably leads to a different conclusion. 
Bone also ignores the procedural context of this case. That is, 
since neither party questioned whether Chanhmany sustained 
threshold medical expenses, they did not avail themselves of the 
procedure in Utah Code Ann. §31A-22~307. Nor was the jury 
instructed or asked to rule on any threshold issue. 
Bone also says that Chanhmany failed to prove and plead 
permanent disability. (Appellee's Brief pp. 16 - 19). Again, in 
doing so, Bone ignores all the uncontested evidence which 
unquestionably requires a different conclusion. Bone also ignores 
the trial judge's conclusion arrived at prior to submitting the 
case to the jury that Chanhmany was disabled and entitled to 
compensation. 
Finally, Bone says that Chanhmany cannot appeal the 
disability issue and her denial of a jury trial on the disability 
issue because she did not submit a jury instruction on permanent 
disability (Appellee's Brief, pp. 21 - 23). 
This reply brief responds to each of Bone's arguments. 
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IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
CHANHMANY DOES NOT HAVE THE BURDEN OF PLEADING AND 
PROVING COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY THRESHOLD 
REQUIREMENTS 
Chanhmany does not have the burden of pleading and 
proving threshold medical expenses for numerous reasons. The 
threshold statute is an affirmative defense. Allstate v. Ivie, 606 
P.2d 1197, 1200 (Utah 1980). Bone has the burden of proving the 
elements triggering the limited immunity granted by the statute. 
In addition, threshold medical expenses was not a jury issue. The 
jury was not asked to find whether Chanhmany sustained medical 
expenses exceeding $3,000, nor were they told what would happen if 
they found that she did not. 
POINT II 
BY NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THRESHOLD DAMAGES AND 
THRESHOLD DISABILITY, BONE WAIVED THESE AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSES 
Bone correctly pled the threshold statute as an 
affirmative defense. However, he failed to submit his affirmative 
defense to the jury via a jury instruction or special verdict. By 
failing to present his defense theory to the jury, Bone waived the 
limited immunity defenses provided by Utah's Threshold Statute. 
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POINT III 
CHANHMANY PLEAD AND TROVED THRESHOLD MEDICAL 
EXPENSES EXCEEDING $3,000 
Regardless of who has the burden of proof on the 
threshold damage issue, the trial evidence conclusively showed that 
Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses resulting 
from the auto accident. Bone's argument that a portion of the 
expenses may be due to Chanhmany's second pregnancy, is unsupported 
speculation and contrary to the direct testimony of all medical 
experts in this case. 
POINT IV 
CHANHMANY PLED AND PROVED THRESHOLD DISABILITY 
Although Chanhmany does not have the burden of proving 
that she is permanently disabled as a result of the auto accident, 
she did so. Contrary to the argument in Bone's Brief, a permanent 
impairment is roughly equivalent to a permanent disability. Both 
medical experts testified Chanhmany was permanently impaired. In 
addition, there is uncontradicted testimony establishing how the 
auto accident altered Chanhmany's capacity to meet personal, social 
and occupational needs and requirements. Based on the evidence, 
the trial court concluded that Chanhmany was disabled and entitled 
to some compensation. For that reason only, the permanent 
disability issue was not presented to the jury. 
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POINT V 
CHANHMANY DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
ON THE THRESHOLD DISABILITY ISSUE 
It is true that a failure to object to a jury instruction 
omission waives the litigants right to appeal the Court's failure 
to give the instruction. In fact, when Bone failed to object to no 
threshold disability instruction, the effect was that the limited 
immunity defense provided by the threshold statute was waived, and 
Chanhmany certainly has no objection to that. However, Chanhmany"s 
appeal is not based on the Court fs failure to instruct on the 
threshold disability issue. Rather, Chanhmany says that the 
following conduct deprived her of a jury trial on the disability 
issue: (1) Prior to instructing the jury, the Court concluded 
that Chanhmany was permanently disabled. (2) Since disability was 
no longer an issue, the Court correctly did not instruct the jury 
that it had to determine whether Chanhmany was permanently 
disabled. (3) When the Court subsequently struck the modest 
general damage award, the Court necessarily concluded that 
Chanhmany was not permanently disabled. 
POINT VI 
CHANHMANY DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO APPEAL A VERDICT 
RESULTING FROM PREJUDICE 
Chanhmany did not waive her right to appeal the verdict 
on the basis that the verdict is a product of prejudice against 
chiropractic treatment. In voir dire, two jurors indicated some 
bias against chiropractors. However, Chanhmany did not move to 
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exclude the two jurors. Had Chanhmany based her appeal on the 
argument that it was improper for the two individuals to serve as 
jurors, Bone would be correct in arguing that Chanhmany waived her 
right to exclude them. However, passing a jury for cause does not 
waive a litigant's right to subsequently appeal a jury verdict 




CHANHMANY DOES NOT HAVE THE BURDEN OF PLEADING AND 
PROVING COMPLIANCE WITH THE STATUTORY THRESHOLD 
REQUIREMENTS 
A. The Defendant, Not Chanhmany. Has the Burden of Proof on a 
Threshold Damages Issue. 
The fundamental theme of Bone's Brief is that Chanhmany 
(the Plaintiff) and not Bone (the Defendant) has the burden of 
proof on threshold issues. Bone's theme is fundamentally wrong. 
Over 21 states have adopted no-fault automobile insurance statutes. 
Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1199 (Utah 1980). Some of the 
statutes, such as those cited in Bone's Brief, hold that the 
"statutory threshold is an essential condition of a plaintiff's 
right to recover . . . and the plaintiff therefore has the burden 
of proving facts which establish that one of the threshold criteria 
has been met". E.g. Pinell v. McCrary, 849 P. 2d 848, 850 (Colo. 
App. 1992) (cited in Bone's Brief, pp. 10-13, 16; See Grand v. 
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Durst, 482 A.2d 1008 (Pa. Supr. 1984) (cited in Bone's Brief, pp. 
10, 12) . 
However, Utah's threshold statute, as construed by the 
appellate courts, does not create another element a plaintiff must 
prove to prevail on a negligence claim. Rather, if a defendant, 
like Bone, has no-fault insurance coverage he is granted limited 
statutory tort immunity. As explained in Allstate v. Ivie, supra 
at 1200: 
[T]he no-fault insurance act confers two 
privileges: First, he is granted partial tort 
immunity. . . . He does, however, remain 
liable for customary tort claims . . . where 
the threshold provisions . . . are met. 
Limited statutory immunity, like any other matter, 
constituting an avoidance, is an affirmative defense which must be 
pled and proved by a defendant, not the plaintiff. Bowman v. Octden 
City, 33 Utah 196, 93 P. 561 (1908); (City court waived detailed 
nature of claim.) Green v. James, 473 F.2d 660 (9th Cir. 1973); 
Maul v. Costan, 928 F.2d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 1991). See also 
Shoreline Dev. , Inc. v. Utah County, 835 P.2d 207 (Utah App. 1992) . 
Moreover, if the threshold requirement was a claim 
element a plaintiff must prove, then the Utah Court of Appeals 
could not have held as it did in Jepson v. State Dept. of 
Corrections, 846 P. 2d 485, 487 (Utah App. 1993) that the statute of 
limitations for filing a notice of claim with a governmental entity 
begins to run when the accident occurs, rather than when the 
injured sustains $3,000 medical damages. Ordinarily, a statute of 
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limitations begin to run when the last element of the tort claim 
occurs. E.g. Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Bonneville Inv. Inc. 
794 P. 2d 11 (Utah 1990). Hence, if the threshold requirement was 
a claim element with the burden of proof on the plaintiff, the 
statute of limitations in Jepson, would not have commenced running 
until the plaintiff sustained $3,000 in medical expenses. 
In addition, Bone in his pleadings admits that the 
threshold requirement is an affirmative defense. Bone plead in his 
answer the threshold statute as his "Sixth Defense" (R. 19 - 20) . 
In summary, Chanhmany does not have the burden of proving 
she sustained in excess of $3,000 medical expenses. Bone has the 
burden of proving Chanhmany did not meet threshold requirements. 
As hereinafter shown in this brief and Point I of Chanhmany's 
opening brief, the proof was contrary to Bone's burden. The 
evidence is overwhelming that Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 
in medical expenses. Thus, the lower court's failure to grant a 
new trial, or in the alternative, an additur, lacked a reasonable 
basis and must be reversed. 
B. Whether Chanhmany Sustained $3,000 in Medical Expenses Was Not 
a Trial Issue. 
Another erroneous albeit companion theme of Bone's Brief 
is that whether Chanhmany met threshold requirements was for the 
jury to decide and the jury correctly decided against her. 
In support of his argument, Bone again relies on cases 
from jurisdictions with no fault statutes different than Utah's. 
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However, Utah's no fault statute does not require that the 
threshold issue be submitted to the jury. Instead, Utah's statute 
is unique. To create a uniform application of the statute 
throughout the state, section 31A-22-307 requires a relative value 
study of medical expenses and accommodations. Compensation Systems 
and Utah's No-Fault Statute, 173 Utah L. Rev. 383, 391. The 
statute then provides a formula for applying the study to a 
particular case. (Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307 (2) (d)) . If threshold 
damage is a disputed issue, the statute provides that the court or 
either party may move to designate an impartial medical panel of 
not more than three licensed physicians to testify. In this case, 
neither party or the judge requested the panel. Instead, they 
stipulated to the admission of Chanhmany's medical expenses 
totalling $3,299.09. (R. 277, 289, lines 14 - 15). The parties' 
decision not to seek a medical panel and their stipulation of 
medical expense evidence shows that threshold medical expenses was 
not a trial issue. 
C. The Jury Was Not Asked to Determine Whether Chanhmany Met the 
Threshold Requirements of Utah Code Ann. 5 31A-22-309(e). 
In this case, Chanhmany need not prove threshold medical 
expenses because the issue was never submitted to the jury. The 
one and only requirement or issue set forth in Section 31A-22-
309(e) is whether the injured person "has sustained. . . (e) 
medical expenses . . . in excess of $3,000." However, the jury was 
not asked to determine whether Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 
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in medical expenses, nor were they told what would happen if they 
did not find that she sustained more than $3,000 in medical 
expenses. Instead, the jury was asked to determine a different 
issue, i.e., What amount should be awarded to reasonably compensate 
Chanhmany for her medical expenses? (Jury Instructions 28 - 29 R. 
3 22, 32 3 Copy set forth in the addenda; Special Verdict R. 34 2 -
343) . 
Chanhmany's appeal is not based on the Court's failure to 
give a jury instruction or verdict requiring the jury to decide 
whether Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 in medical expenses. 
Instead, Chanhmany's appeal is based on the fact that whether an 
injured person meets the Section 3.09(e) threshold requirements was 
not a jury issue. The court's subsequent reliance on the jury's 
finding of a different issue to strike the general damage award 
lacks a reasonable basis and should be reversed. 
POINT II 
BY NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THRESHOLD DAMAGES AND 
THRESHOLD DISABILITY, BONE WAIVED THESE AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSES 
As set forth in Point I of this reply brief, Utah's 
threshold statute grants automobile accident defendants a limited 
statutory immunity which must be pled and proved by the defendant. 
Bone plead the threshold issue (R. 19 - 20). However, he did not 
request the Court to submit a threshold defense jury instruction. 
Neither did he submit a verdict form which required the jury to 
determine whether Chanhmany was permanently disabled. 
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The purpose of jury instructions is to set forth the 
legal theories of both parties. E.g. Elkincrton v. Foust, 618 P. 2d 
37 (Utah 1980), if they are supported by the evidence. Powers v. 
Gene's Bldg. Materials, 567 P.2d 174, 176 (Utah 1977). 
Specifically, if a defendant wants the jury to consider an 
affirmative defense, he must tender a sufficient jury instruction. 
U.R.C.P. 51; Alta Mutual Ins. Co. v. Northincrton, 561 So.2d 1041, 
1047 (Ala. 1990), (failure to instruct on punitive damages 
standards) ; C.F. John Call Engineering v. Manti City, 795 P. 2d 682, 
684 (Utah App. 1990) (mitigation defense instruction should have 
been withheld); Fuller v. Zinik Sporting Goods Co., 538 P.2d 1036 
(Utah 1975), (plaintiff waived instruction on burden of proof). 
In this case, Bone failed to present any instruction on 
threshold immunity. He did not present a threshold disability 
instruction. He did not present a threshold damages instruction. 
As set forth in Appellee's Brief pages 19 through 20, the failure 
to propose an instruction, waives the claim or defense, 
POINT III 
CHANHMANY PLEAD AND PROVED THRESHOLD MEDICAL 
EXPENSES EXCEEDING $3,000 
A. The $3,000 Threshold Requirement. 
As set forth in Point I, the one and only requirement of 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(e) is whether the injured person "has 
sustained . . . (e) medical expenses to a person in excess of 
$3,000." The statute does not require that the expenses be 
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reasonable. If a party wishes to challenge the reasonable cost, he 
proceeds under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307(2) (d) . Moreover, the 
term "medical expenses" is broadly defined to "include expenses for 
any nonmedical remedial care and treatment rendered in accordance 
with a recognized religious method of healing." Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-307(3). 
B. The Proof. 
Although Chanhmany doesn't have the burden of pleading 
and proving threshold medical expenses, she clearly proved she 
sustained medical expenses in excess of $3,000. The evidence is 
marshalled in Pages 14 - 16 of Chanhmany1 s Brief. The only 
evidence offered at trial consists of copies of medical expenses 
totalling $3,299.09 broken down as follows: 
Gold Cross Ambulance $ 158.09 
Holy Cross Hospital 256.00 
FHP 469.00 
Dr. Gary Whitley (Chiropractor) 2,416.00 
TOTAL $3,299.09 
(Summary Page of Exhibit P-3, copy attached in the addendum), 
together with testimony of three witnesses, Chanhmany, Dr. Whitley 
(Chanhmany's medical expert) and Dr. Moress (Bone's medical 
expert). None of them testified that Chanhmany did not sustain in 
excess of $3,000 in medical expenses. Quite the opposite. See 
Chanhmany1s Brief pp. 1 4 - 1 6 . 
In response, Bone says that the jury could conclude 
differently because part of the chiropractic care could have been 
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necessitated by Chanhmany's subsequent second pregnancy and/or her 
failure to continue with exercises prescribed by Dr. Whitley. Bone 
concludes "The jury was free to assimilate this evidence . . . and 
determine that some or all of the treatments incurred were not 
related to the accident . . . [and] that plaintiff had not 
mitigated her damages." Bone's Brief pp. 1 4 - 1 5 . 
Thus, the narrow question is whether viewing the evidence 
in totality, could reasonable minds conclude that at least a 
portion of the chiropractic treatment expenses were incurred as a 
result of the pregnancy or failure to exercise? The uncontested 
testimony shows that they could not. 
Chanhmany testified she does the exercises prescribed by 
Dr. Whitley. (Transcript of Proceedings April 2 7 - 2 9 , 1993, p. 78 
lines 11 - 15, hereinafter "Tr. p. ") . When she subsequently 
testified that she did not do the exercises, she explained that she 
misunderstood the second question. (Tr. p. 89 lines 13 - 15). 
Chanhmany testified that prior to the accident she had 
never had any neck or back pain despite an earlier pregnancy. (Tr. 
pp. 63 lines 20 - 21; 72 lines 12 - 22) . She now has chronic back 
pain and a numbness in her shoulder. (Tr. pp. 7 3 - 76). 
The medical notes of Dr. Penny, the FHP physician show 
that the reason chiropractic treatment was interrupted was because 
of Chanhmany's inability to compensate the chiropractor. (Tr. p. 
355, lines 6 - 22). There is no conflicting testimony. 
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Dr. Whitley testified that on taking her medical history, 
examining her x-rays and conducting a physical examination, he 
diagnosed Chanhmany as having a sprained back together with 
ligament, muscle and nerve damage caused by the auto accident. 
(Tr. pp. 128 - 129) . He testified that he treats a lot of these 
injuries. (Tr. p. 129 lines 17 - 18) . When Chanhmany returned for 
treatment, she did not report any new trauma, and she explained 
that she still had pain from her injury. (Tr. p. 135). Although 
Dr. Whitley testified that pregnancy could aggravate Chanhmany's 
injuries, he concluded that the back pain and numbness experienced 
by Chanhmany was still due to the accident: 
MR. WELLS: Q. Did you consider yourself still treating 
the original injury? 
A. That was still what I felt was the reason why 
she still had the problem. 
(Tr. p. 135, lines. 16 - 19). 
* * * 
MR. WELLS: Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not 
the complaint Chanhmany has made over the 
period of time that you have treated her 
relate to a particular trauma. 
A. I would say it would stem back to the car 
accident. 
(Tr. p. 174, lines. 15 - 20). 
Bone's medical expert, a neurologist, also testified in 
support of Dr. Whitley's conclusion. Moress testified that 
Chanhmany had lower back strain and shoulder numbness. (Tr. pp. 217 
- 218). Based on these two injuries, he gave her a 6.8% impairment 
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rating. (Tr. p. 230). He testified that Chanhmanyfs impairment 
was due to the auto accident. He did not testify that it was due 
to a second pregnancy. 
MR. WELLS: Q. Okay. And so in your opinion Khai Chanhmany 
is 6.8% less than normal. 
A. That is correct. 
MR. WELLS: Q. And that's because of the injury from the 
accident? 
A. Yes. 
(Tr. p. 235, lines. 19 - 21, 24 - 25; p. 236, In. 1). 
In summary, medical experts from both sides testified 
that Chanhmanyfs injuries were due to the auto accident. Neither 
expert concluded Chanhmanyfs second pregnancy necessitated 
treatment. The medical testimony coupled with Chanhmany's direct 
testimony and her medical history all conclusively show that she 
did not require chiropractic treatment as a result of her second 
pregnancy. 
In summary, Bone's claim that part of the expenses 
incurred with Dr. Whitley could have resulted from the second 
pregnancy is nothing but unsupported speculation. Thus, the jury 
could not and did not find that a portion of her chiropractic 
treatment was due to her second pregnancy. The fact finder is not 
allowed to disregard unimpeached, uncontradicted testimony. Rowdin 
v. Stanley, 455 F.2d 482, 484 (10th Cir. 1972), Smith v. Idaho 
University Federal Credit Union, 760 P.2d 19 (Idaho 1988). 
Moreover, even if there is a smattering of evidence supporting a 
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finding, it will be reversed if an examination of the evidence in 
totality, leads the reviewing court to conclude that a mistake has 
been made. Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), 
Cuddy v. Carmen, 762 F.2d 119, 124, (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
In this case, taking the evidence as a whole leads to 
only one conclusion. The chiropractic treatments and expenses were 
sustained as a result of the auto accident. For this reason, the 
orders denying a new trial and striking the general damages each 
lacked a reasonable basis and should be reversed. 
POINT IV 
CHANHMANY PLED AND PROVED THRESHOLD DISABILITY 
A. Introduction - Appellee's Brief. 
Incredibly, Bone says that Chanhmany failed to prove a 
permanent disability. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 15-17). Bone admits 
that Chanhmany was permanently impaired but argues: 
In this case, no evidence was ever introduced 
which attempted to correlate the medical 
findings of impairment with an assessment in 
[sic] their impact on Plaintiff's lifestyle, 
earning capacity or job functions 
(disability). 
(Id. at 17). 
Bone also says that no objective evidence of a disability was ever 
presented to the two medical experts or the jury. 
As hereinafter demonstrated, there was overwhelming 
evidence that Chanhmany was disabled. There is no evidence that 
she was not. The Court's failure to submit the disability issue to 
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the jury was not due to a lack of disability evidence, but instead 
was due to the fact that disability was not a contested trial 
issue. 
B. The Threshold Disability Requirement. 
A person injured in an automobile accident may maintain 
a cause of action if he sustains a "(c) permanent disability" Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(1) (c) . 
Utah's no fault statute does not define what a "permanent 
disability" is. However, Utah's appellate courts have defined the 
term. Although, this court would not know it from reading Bone's 
brief, the authority Bone cites holds that a permanent impairment 
is often the sole or real criteria of permanent disability. 
Northwest Carriers v. Ind. Commission, 639 P.2d 138, 140.fn.3 (Utah 
1981) (cited in Appellee's Brief pp. 16 - 17). 
Similarly, for threshold purposes other states have 
defined a permanent disability as a permanent injury. E.g. Elliott 
V. Simon, 385 A.2d 249, 250 (N.J. 1978). 
AMA Guidelines define a disability as an alteration of an 
individual's capacity to meet personal, social or occupational 
demands or to meet statutory or regulatory requirements. 
(Appellee's Brief p. 17). 
Finally, amended Utah Code Ann. §31A-22-309(c) , treats 
permanent disability as equivalent to a permanent impairment based 
upon objective findings. An objective finding is what "you can 
IS 
objectively look at in or measure it or feel it.11 (Tr. p. 138, 
lines. 4-5). 
C. The Only Reason the Jury was not Presented the Disability 
Issue Was Because the Parties' Medical Experts and the Court 
Concluded That Chanhmany Was Permanently Disabled and . The 
Only Dispute was the Extent of the Disability. 
Contrary to the unsupported assertion in Bonefs brief, 
lack of disability evidence was not the reason the threshold 
disability issue was not presented to the jury. Rather, the jury 
was not asked to determine whether Chanhmany met threshold 
disability because the evidence of disability was so overwhelming 
that there was no cause to submit the issue to the jury. In a 
conference with counsel held well in advance of instructing the 
jury, the Court concluded that Chanhmany was injured, disabled, and 
entitled to compensation. The only issue left for the jury to 
decide was how much: 
THE COURT: It has been established by both doctors that 
there's an injury . . . they both assigned a 
rate of disability. One is 5 percent and the 
other is 12 percent. The jury is to make the 
determination between five percent and twelve 
percent. . . . 
(Tr. p. 269 lines 2 - 8). 
If the Court or the parties had any question of whether 
Chanhmany was disabled, the threshold disability issue would have 
been presented to the jury. The fact that the Court did not do so, 
and the parties did not request the court to do so shows that at 
the conclusion of the evidence, there was no dispute as to whether 
Chanhmany was disabled. 
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D. The Disability Proof. 
1. Evidence of an alteration in Chanhmany's capacity 
to meet personal/ social and occupational demands. 
Contrary to the unsupported allegations in Bone's brief, 
there was plenty of evidence showing that the accident injury 
altered Chanhmanyfs ability to meet personal, social and 
occupational demands. Chanhmany testified that she was no longer 
able to lift 50 pound totes at work. (Tr. pp. 76, 77). Her co-
workers said the same thing. (Tr. p. 260) . She was transferred to 
a different job. (Tr. pp. 76 Ins 19 - 24, 90 lines 20 - 25). 
Chanhmany has difficulty in lifting laundry and groceries. (Tr. p. 
77). She can no longer participate in sports. (Tr. p. 79 lines 21 
- 25). Exercises are difficult. She cannot do sit ups. (Tr. p. 
78 lines 3 - 10) . There was no contrary testimony. It is 
impossible therefore to marshall any conflicting evidence because 
there is none, the foregoing evidence clearly establishes that 
Chanhmany has had an alteration of her capacity to meet personal, 
social and occupational demands. 
2. Evidence of a permanent impairment or injury based 
on objective findings. 
As set forth in Chanhmany*s opening brief, there is no 
question that Chanhmany is permanently impaired. Chanhmanyfs 
medical expert gave her a 12 percent whole person impairment 
rating. (Tr. p. 148 - 150). Bone's medical expert assigned a 
permanent impairment rating of 6.8 percent. Bone apparently 
concedes that Chanhmany is impaired but grumbles that there was no 
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objective evidence upon which the permanent impairment ratings were 
based so Chanhmany was not permanently disabled. (Appellee's Brief 
p. 21). In making this argument, Bone is playing with semantics. 
As stated in Northwest Carrier v. Ind. Commission, 639 P. 2d 138 140 
(Utah 1981), a "permanent impairment, is in fact the sole or real 
criterion of permanent disability far more often than readily 
acknowledged". More importantly, however, the record discloses 
that Bone's argument is factually incorrect. Applying the AMA 
Guidelines, Dr. Whitley objectively measured Chanhmanyfs range of 
motion and concluded that it was restricted. (Tr. pp. 109, 110 and 
144) . In addition, after conducting a battery of medically 
objective tests, Dr. Whitley concluded that Chanhmanyfs impairment 
was 12.8 percent. (Tr. pp. 138, 139, 143 - 148 and 149). 
POINT V 
CHANHMANY DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 
ON THE THRESHOLD DISABILITY ISSUE 
Bone, in his brief, argues that Chanhmany waived her 
right to a jury trial on the disability issue because she did not 
propose a jury instruction or a verdict containing the threshold 
disability issue. (Appellee's Brief, p. 23). 
There are at least three reasons for rejecting Bone's 
argument. First, threshold damages is an affirmative defense which 
was waived when Bone failed to submit a jury instruction or verdict 
containing the threshold damages issue. (See Point II). 
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Second, the only reason a threshold disability jury 
instruction wasn't proposed was because the Court concluded prior 
to instructing the jury that Chanhmany was disabled and entitled to 
compensation. Hence, there was no threshold damage issue to submit 
to the jury. 
Finally, Bone misconstrues Chanhmanyfs appeal. Chanhmany 
is not arguing that a new trial should be awarded because the judge 
failed to give a jury instruction. What Chanhmany does contend and 
Bone fails to acknowledge, is that if the threshold disability 
affirmative defense is going to be considered, the defense should 
have been considered by the jury. The Court can not take from the 
jury the disability issue by concluding that Chanhmany was 
disabled, not instructing the jury on the disability issue, and 
then subsequently changing its mind after the jury renders its 
verdict. Plainly and simply put, the threshold disability 
affirmative defense was not an issue, but if it was an issue, it 
was an issue for the jury to decide. 
POINT VI 
CHANHMANY DID NOT WAIVE HER RIGHT TO APPEAL A VERDICT 
RESULTING FROM PREJUDICE 
In her opening brief, Chanhmany argued that she was 
entitled to a new trial because the verdict results from prejudice. 
Chanhmany supported her argument by citing the low verdict, the 
jury's disregard of competent evidence, and answers of two jurors 
in voir dire. In response, Bone effectively says that since 
22 
Chanhmany did not challenge either of the two jurors, but instead 
passed the jury for cause, Chanhmany waived her right to appeal. 
However, Chanhmany's appeal is not based on the 
composition of the jury. She does not say that a juror challenged 
for cause was allowed to sit. She did not say that a Court 
required her to exercise a preemptory challenge to exclude a juror 
that should have been excluded for cause. If she had, then Bone 
would be correct in asserting that Chanhmany waived her right to 
challenge the composition of the jury. 
However, Chanhmany has not challenged the composition of 
the jury, she's challenging its verdict. A small damage award can 
and will be set aside if the jury's verdict results from passion or 
prejudice. U.R.C.P. 59(a)(5). Evidence of prejudice includes a 
low verdict, the jury's disregard of competent uncontested 
evidence, and answers to questions on voir dire. With regard to 
the latter, Chanhmany is not arguing on the basis of a juror's 
answer that the juror should have been excluded. What she does 
submit is that the answer disclosing some bias, which, when coupled 
with the low verdict and the disregard of competent evidence 
demonstrates that the verdict is the product of prejudice. Because 
the damages award is the product of prejudice, Chanhmany is 





Chanhmany does not have the burden of pleading and 
proving threshold damages or threshold disability. Bone does. 
However, regardless of who has the burden of proof, the marshalled 
evidence shows that Chanhmany sustained more than $3,000 in medical 
expenses and she is permanently disabled. Moreover, by failing to 
submit an instruction on threshold issues, Bone waived the 
affirmative defense offered by the threshold statute. Hence, 
threshold damages was not an issue nor was threshold disability. 
In addition, Chanhmany did not waive her right appeal the verdict 
on the basis of prejudice. She also did not waive her right to a 
jury trial on all factual issues. For each of these reasons, 
Chanhmany should be awarded a new-trial. 
DATED this J0 day of July, 1994. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 3ct> 
If you find the issues in favor of -the plaintiff and 
against the defendant, it will be your duty to award the 
plaintiff such damages, if any, as you may find from a 
preponderance of the evidence will fairly and adequately 
compensate him for any injury and damage he has sustained as a 
proximate result of the defendant's negligence complained of by 
him. 
In awarding such damages, you may consider the nature and 
extent of the injuries sustained by him; the degree and 
character of his physical suffering; its probable duration and 
severity, and the extent to which he has been prevented from 
pursuing the ordinary affairs of life as theretofore enjoyed by 
him; and any disability or loss of earning capacity resulting 
from such injury. 
You may consider whether any of the above will, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, continue in the future, and if 
you so find, award such damages as will fairly and justly 
compensate the plaintiff therefor. 
INSTRUCTION NO. S*P\ 
You may award such special damages as you find from a 
preponderance of the evidence the plaintiff is entitled for: 
Reasonable and necessary expenses for doctors, x-rays, and 
other medical services actually incurred by plaintiff. 
